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Abstract
The  existence  of a relationship  between  the  degree  of skewness  of the  cross-section
distribution  of price changes  and  aggregate  inflation  has  been  known.for  some  time. The
conventional  interpretation  of .this  relationship  is that it reflects sluggishness  in the adjustment
of individual  prices  in response  to shocks.  In this  paper  we question  the  traditiornl
interpretation  of this observation,  and  show  that  a simple  equilibrium  model  with complete
price  flexibility is capable  of reproducing  the relationship  observed  in the  data.
'We thank  Dave  Altig, Greg  Huffman  and  seminar  participants  at Texas  A&M University
and  Rice  University  for comments  on earlier  drafts. The  views  expressed  are  those  of the
authors  and  do not  necessarily  reflect  the  views  of the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Dallas  or the
Federal  Reserue  Syslem.1. Introduction.
There is a substantial  literature that documents  the relationship  between  the first and
second  moments  of the  distribution  of price  changes,  or more  precisely,  the  relationship
between  the  aggregate  rate  of inflation  and  the  variability  of relative  price  changes  for
individual  products  (appropriately  defined). This literature  originated  in the  high-inflation
experience  of the 1970's,  and  was  motivated  in part  by the  idea  that  one  of the  costs  of high
inflation was greater  price uncertainty  which undermined  the efficiency of the price system  as
a transmitter  of information  about  relative  scarcities.  Most studies  find a positive  correlation
between  the variability of individual price changes  and the aggregate  inJlation rate.
Representative  srudies  include  Vining and  Elwertowski  (1976)  for the  United  States  using
annual  data  and  Domberger  (1987)  for the United  Kingdom  using  quarterly  data.  This
literature  has.been  reviewed  by Marquez  and  Vining (i984) and  more  recently  by Golob
(1993). Most recently,  Ball and  Mankiw (1995)  have  further  documented  the  existence  of a
positive  relationship  between  inflation  and  the standard  deviation  of the cross  section
distribution  of price  change  for components  of the  PPI; essentially  updating  the  earlier
findings  of Vining and  Elwertowski.
A number of these  earlier studies  also noted  the existence  of a statistical  relationship
between  the shape  of the  cross-section  distribution  of prices  (as  measured  by a statistic  such
as  the  skewness  of this distribution)  and  the aggregate  inflation  rate. Yet this  relationship
has  received  much  less  attention  than  that  between  the  variance  (or standard  deviation)  of the
cross  section  distribution  and  aggregate  inflation. This is surprising,  as  tlle former
relationship  is arguably  stronger  than  the  latter. For example,  using  data  from Vining andElwertowski's  Tables  I and  2, the  simple  correlation  coefficient  between  the  mean  rate  of
price  change  and  the  standard  deviatibn  is 0.23 for the  wPI and  0.22 for the  CPI.  But the
simple  correlation  between  the  mean  rate  of price  change  and  the skewness  of the  distribution
is 0.41 for the CPI and  0.61 for the  WPI.  (Note  that  the  aggregate  inflation  measure  in
Vining and  Elwertowski  is the  mean  of the  distribution  of individual  price  changes,  which  is
not the same  as the inflation rate as measured  by the CPI or WPI.  The latter is more
accurately  thought  of as  a weighted  mean  of individual  price  changes).  Similar  correlations
can  be  calculated  from the  data  in Table  II of Ball and  Mankiw (1995). The  most  striking
-  finding from that table is that the correlation between  the "Asyml0"  measure  of the degree
of asymmetry  in the cross  section  distribution of price changes  and the aggregate  inflation
rate  is 0.85 (as  opposed  to correlations  of 0.38 and  0.57 for the  unweighted  and  weighted
standard  deviations  respectively).2  Figure  I plots  inflation  and  Asyml0.
The  motivation  for studying  this relationship,  and  its interpretation,  is somewhat
different to that for studying  the relationship  between  the first and second  moments  of the
distribution  of price  changes.  Marquez  and  Vining (1984)  note  that  lThe ,..reason  for
studying  the shape  of the  distribution  of relative  prices  has  to do with the degree  of price
flexibility  in the economy.  ..an asymmetrical  or ska.ued  distribution of relative  price changes
indicates  the existence  of price inflexibility .in the economy. A normal distribution of relative
price  changes,  on the  other  hand,  is evidence  of price  flexibility in the econorny.  "  (Marquez
-10
2The  statistic  Asyml1  is defined  as  Asyml|  =  f rhQ)dr +  [ rh(r)dr  where  r denotes  an ' 
!-  {o'
industry  inflation  rate  minus  the  mean  of industry  inflation  rates  and  ft  (r) is the  density  of r
including  weighting  for industry  size.and  Vining, i984, p. 10,  emphasis  added). They  further  argue  that  the  presence  of skewness
in the  distribution  of relative  price  changes  is indicative  of asymmetric  price  responses  in the
economy,  noting  for example  that  right skewness  in the  distribution  would  be consistent  with
downward  rigidity of prices.
Most recently  Ball and  Mankiw (1995)  argue  that  the  existence  of a statistically
significant  relationship  between  the  skewness  of the  cross  section  distribution  of price
changes  an  aggregate  inflation  is a novel  empirical  prediction  of menu  cost  models  and  as
such  lends  credibility  to models  of this  type.
There  are  at least  two reasons  why we might  want  to be skeptical  about  the  traditional
interpretations  of the skewness-inflation  relationship  as  reflecting  nominal  rigidities. The
first is that,  despite  frequent  claims  to the  contrary,  there  is remarkably  little serious
documentation  ofjust how frequently  prices  do in fact  change.  The  claims  of Ball and
Mankiw (1994)  notwithstanding,  there  are  not in fact "...many microeconomic  studies  of the
behavior  of prices..."(Ball  and  Mankiw, 1994,  p. 131)  that  find substantial  price stickiness.
Four would  be more  like it, and  even  these  studies  are  not immune  to elementary  criticisms
about  how prices  ought  to be  measured.3  But perhaps  a more  important  criticism  of the
traditional  interpretation  of the skewness-inflation  relationship  is the  failure  of previous
authors  to demonstrate  formally how a model incorporating  menu  costs  associated  with
changing  prices  can  in fact generate  this  correlation  when  calibrated  to match  cenain  features
of the  real  world data,  and  further,  to show  that  a model  with complete  price  flexibility
cannot.
iThese  studies  are  critically  surveyed  in Wynne  (1995).In this  paper  we set  ourselves  the  task  of discovering  to what  extent  can  an
equilibrium  model  with complete  price  flexibility generate  the  correlations  that  we see  in the
data,  and  further,  to docurnent  those  dimensions  along  which  the  model  fails. We show  that
a simple  equilibrium  model  with no interaction  between  sectors  and  with all sectors  subject  to
iid shocks  is in fact incapable  of generating  the relationship  between  skewness  and  inflation
that  we see  in the  actual  data. This would  seem  to confirm  the  prior beliefs  of many
advocates  of the sticky-price interpretation  of this relationship. But we will  also show  that
when this most elementary  of equilibrium models  is calibrated  to match  certain features  of
the  postwar  U.S. economy  (specifically  the input-output  relationships  between  sectors  and  the
volatility  of productivity  shocks  that  can  be meazured  using  postwar  data),  it is remarkably
successful  in capturing  the skewness-inflation.relationship.  We further  document  that
skewness  seems  to have  a stronger  leading  than contemporaneous  relationship  with aggregate
inflation,  and  that  the simple  model  we sketch  out in this  paper  is less  successful  in capturing
this aspect  of the  data. It remains  to b€ seen  whether  models  with sticky  prices  (of whatever
sort)  are  more  or less  successful  in this  resard.
2. Data
The  most  recent  shrdy  of the  rclationship  between  skewness  and  inflation  is.Ball  and
Mankiw  (1995). They  look at the  relationship  between  the  distribution  of prices  in the
Producer  Price  Index  (PPI)  on an annual  basis  over  the  period  1949-1989.  One  advantage  of
looking  at the  PPI is that  it is available  at a high degree  of disaggregation.  At the  four digit
level  of disaggregation,  the  number  of component  series  rises  from 213  in 1949  to 343  in1989.a  Ball and  Mankiw  document  the relationship  between  the  distribution  of the changes  in
these  several  hundred  price series  and  the  overall  inflation  rate  (as  measured  by the  PPI).
Their data  analysis  reveals  a number  of interesting  findings. First, there  is
considerable  variation  in the  distribution  of price  changes  over  time. For example,  in 1987
the  distribution  is fairly symmetric,  while in 1973  it is skewed  sharply  to the right and  in
1986  it is skewed  sharply  to the left.s Not surprisingly,  both  1973  and  1986  were  also  years
in which  there  were  significant  oil price  shocks,  with oil prices  rising  dramatically  in 1973
and  falling dramatically  in 1986. Second,  they  document  a statistically  significant
relationship  between  their various  measures  of skewness  and  the  overall  inflation  rate. They
show  that the skewness  of the distribution of price changes  tends  to dominate  the standard
deviation  of the  distribution  as  an.  explanatory.  variable  for inflation. This result  is robust  to
their  use  of any  of three  measures  of skewness.
The  relationship  between  skewness  and  inflation  was  also  noted  in the  earlier  paper  by
Vining and  Elwertowski  (1976). They  noted  that  "...the shape  of the  distribution  of
individual  price  changes...is  generally  a highly skewed  and  asymmetrical  distribution:  and
there are at least  suggestions  in the data  that the direction of skew is the same  as the
direction  of change  in the rate  of inflation  (a high positive  skew  has  been  a particularly
prominent  feature  of the  current  inflation).  " (Vining and  Elwertowski,  1976,  p.703). Vining
and  Elwertowski  provide  summary  statistics  on the  distribution  of price  changes  in the  CPI
aVining  and  Elwertowski  (7976)  analyze  PPI data  at the  eight  digit level  of
disaggregation,  which gives  them  a sample  size  of between  1159  and  2033  commodities.
5The  skewness  of a distribution  is defined  as E[(X-p)311o3  where  p is the mean  of the
distribution  of X and o is the standard  deviation.and  WPI, but do not examine  the  strength  of tlte relationship  between  them.
The first step  in our investigation  was to try to replicate  the relationship  between
skewness  and  inflation  using  a different  data  set. We look at prices  as  measured  by the
(implicit)  GDP deflators  for 49 industries  or commodities.  In Table  1 we present  statistics
on the  behavior  of various  measures  of skewness  as  leading  or lagging  indicators  of different
measures  of inflation. This is an  aspect  of the  relationship  between  these  two variables  that
seems  to have  been  neglected  by previous  authors. We start by examining  the CPI and PPI
data  sets  studied  by Vining and  Elwertowski  (1976)  and  Ball and  Mankiw (1995). Note  that
in the  Vining and  Elwertowski  data  set  the strongest  correlation  between.  skewness  and
aggregate  inflation (which they measure  simply as the unweighted  mean  of the cross  section
distribution  of prices)  is contemporaneous,.although  we do see  some  modest  leading
behavior. In the Ball and  Mankiw data  set,  rmweighted  skewness  seems  to lead  inflation,
while for the  weighted  skewness  measure  xfi  the  AsymL}  measure,  the  peak  correlation  rs
again  contemporaneous.  Finally in the  last  four rows  of the  table  we document  the
correlations  between  unweighted  and weighted  measures  of skewness  and aggregate  inflation
using  the  GDP price  series. In the  first two rows  we measure  aggregate  inflation  as  simply
the  unweighted  or weighted  mean  of the  cross  section  distribution  of price  changes,  while in
the last  two rows we measure  inflation  as  the  rate  of change  in the  fixed-weight  GDP
deflator.6  In this data  set  we see  a much  stronqer  tendency  for skewness  to lead  the inflation
uThe  difference between  the three measures  of aggregate  inflation is as follows.  The
I
unweighted  mean  of the  GDP deflators  for each  sector  is simply  I  Alog(P,.)/I where  l is the
number  of sectors;  the  weighted  mean  is given  by !  w,Alog(f,.ji  anO  tfre  rate  of inflation
(continued...)rate  (that  is, the  correlations  with aggregate  inflation  are  higher  for lags  of either  measure  of
skewness  than  for leads,  and  the  peak  correlation  is at a one-year  lag). Finally, note  that
there  is a somewhat  stronger  correlation  between  the  weighted  skewness  measure  and
aggregate  inflation  than  between  the  unweighted  measure  and  aggregate  inflation.
It might  reasonably  be argued  that  the  simple  correlations  in Table  I fail to control
for the fact that inflation is quite persistent,  and the possibility that if this persistence  were
taken  into account  the  conelation  between  inflation  and  skewness  would  disappear.  Table  2
presents  some  simple regression  results  for the relationship  between  tlte rate of inflation as
measured  by the rate of change  of the fixed-weight GDP.  deflator and measures  of the
distribution  of prices  across  forty-nine  sectors  of the U.S. economy.  These  regressions  are
similar  to regressions  reported  by Ball and  Mankiw to illustrate  the  explanatory  power  of a
skewness  measure.  Table  2 shows  that  skewness  does  seem  to have  a statistically  significant
relationship  with aggregate  inflation,  albeit  with a lag, even  when  the  past  behavior  of
inflation is taken  into account. Note that this is true for both the weighted  and  unweighted
measures.  We also repoft the results  of including the standard  deviation  of the cross  section
distribution  in the regression,  and  find that  it does  contribute  to explaining  the  variation  in
inflation. This  contrasts  with Ball and  Mankiw's  finding  that  the  standard  deviation  has
marginal  incremental  explanatory  power  at best. We also  report  the  F-statistics  for standard
exclusion  restrictions  on the skewness  and  standard  deviation  variables  and  find that  we are
able  to reject  the hypothesis  that  either  variable  should  be  excluded  from the regression.
6(...continued)
II
as  measured  by the  aggregate  GDP  deflator  is  log(l  P,  li,l|Pi.,,Fi.). -'7i 
"  ,r
1Overall  the  results  in Table  2 support  the  evidence  from Table  I that  there  is a
statistically  significant  relationship  between  inflation  and  the  skewness  of the  distribution  of
individual  price  changes.  It is also  clear  that  we can  obtain  the same  strong  statistical
relationship  between  the  skewness  of the  distribution  of price  changes  and  aggregate  inflation
looking  ar  only 49 prices  as  Ball and  Mankiw or Vining and  Elwertowski  do looking  at
several  hundred  prices. The relationship  between  these  two variables  seems  to be fairly
robust.  Our objective in what follows is to see  to what extent  we can replicate  the facts
about  the relationship  between  skewness  and inflation as documented  in here in the context of
a,.simple  equilibrium  model.
3. An equilibrium model  with multiple sectors,
The  next  step  in our analysis  is to lay out a simple  equilibrium  model  that  is capable
of addressing  questions  about  the relationship  between  the  distribution  of price changes  and
aggregate  inflation. The  model  presented  here  is the simplest  one  we could  think of that
could  begin  to provide  insights  into this relationship  and  is essentially  a variant  of the  model.
of Long  and  Plosser  (1983)  with a larger  number  of sectors,  extended  to include  a role for
money.
Households:
The  economy  is populated  by a large  number  of identical  consumers,  each  of whom









where  1 >  B >  0 is  the  discount  factor,  q  = (Cr.r,Cr.,,...,C1.)/  is an lxl  vector  of
commodities  consumed  at date  t, and  l,  denotes  leisure  at date  t.  The  point-in{ime  utility
function is furthermore assumed  to have the following specific functional form:
I
u(C,,  L)  = oolog(L)  + f  o,tog(C,.)
where  0, > 0,  Vi.  If 0i =0  for some  i > I then  that  commodity  has  no  utility  value  to
the  consumer.
The budget  constraint  of the representative  consumer  is given by
I
.8w,.,H,.,  * *  l"rNr-t * EPlE\.,.,' N,
where 1V,.,  denotes  the (nominal) wage  in sector  i at date  t,  H..t denotes  hours worked in
sector  i at date  t,  Ri,j,t  denotes  the  rental  rate  during  period  t of capital  produced  in sector  j
and  employed  in sector  d  during  period  r, 4,;,,_r and ;'ir  represents  the  gross  rate  of increase
in the  money  stock  at date  r.  In addition  to wage  and  rental  income,  the  sources  of funds
each period  include  a transfer  from the.  government  which is directly  proportional  to nominalmoney  holdings  held  at the  end  of the  previous  period, (pr.r-l)lv,_,.7  The  uses  of funds  each
III
period  are  for consumption  expenditures, 
PP,.rC,.,, 
purchases  of new  capital 
f,e,.,1\,,,,
and  funds  held  over  to the  next  period, N,.  Households  also  receive  any  profit income
earned  by firms, but this is always  equal  to zero  in equilibrium.
We introduce  money  by specifying  a simple  quantity-theory  relationship.  Specifically
we assume  that  consumers  are  obliged  to hold some  fraction v of their  consumption
purchases  each  period  in the  form of cash  at the  end  of the  period. That  is, household
decisions  are  subject  to the  constraint,
I
x, r nDP,,,c,,,
where N, denotes  the stoak  of nominal money  balances  held at the end  of period t and
I
,8, 
P,.,C,.,  denotes  nominal  consumption  expenditures  during peiod t, with P,., denoting  the
price  of good  I at date  l, and q.,  denoting  the  quantity  of good  i purchased  for consumption
purposes  at date  t.  Specifying  the timing this way, along with the assumption  that transfers
are  proportional  to holdings  of nominal  balances,  minimizes  the importance  of nominal
shocks  in this  model. The  existence  of this constraint  can  be thought  of as  arising  due  to the
need  to, say,  maintain  some  minimum  level  of cash  balances  in a bank  account  !o facilitate
consumption  purchases  made  with inside  money. The  addition  of this  constraint  to the  model
allows  us to consider  the  behavior  of prices  denominated  in terms  of money  rather  than
'Note  that  this assumption  is different  from the  usual  assumption  that  monetary  transfers
from the  government  are  lump sum. By departing  from the  standard  assumption  of lump
sum  transfers  we create  an  environment  in which monev  is suDerneutral.
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(4)utility as  in Long and  Plosser  (1983).
The  remaining  constraint  that  the  consumer  faces  is on the  allocation  of available
tlme,
I
L, + .1.  H,.,  = 1
which states  that the sum of leisure and  time worked in each  sector  cannot  exceed  the total
amount  of time available,  which  we normalize  to 1.
The  household's  problem  is to maximize  the  objective  function  given  in (1) above
subject.  to the  budget  constraint  (3), the  cash  constraint  (4) and  the  constraint  on the
allocation  of time (5).
Firms:
Production  possibilities  in the  i'th sector  are  give  by the following  production
function:
(5,l
v,,,  =  2,,,n!;fixi;1,-, (6)
wherc  Zr,, = n',2,.,  is a random  variable  or productivity  shock  that  denotes  the  state  of
technology  in the i'th sector  at date  r (where  l,l is the  deterministic  growth  component  of
labor  augmenting  technical  change),  I1,,,  denotes  hours  worked  in the  i'th sector  at date  t,
and  tri,;.r,r denotes  the  quantity  of output  of the  7'th industry  employed  as  capital  in the  i'th
1lindustry  at date  t (which  must  be in place  at the  end  of period  t-1).  The  parameters  of the




= 1 for i = I, 2, ...,1.  That  is, we  assume  that  the  technology  exhibits
constant  returns  to scale.
Market Clearing:
The specification  of the model is completed  by specifying a market clearing condition
for each  sector:
I
Y,,,=ci,,*f,K,,,r
which  simply  states  that  available  output  is allocated  to consumption  or is stored  for use  as
capital  input  next  period.
Equilibrium:
The simple structure  of the economy  sketched  out above  makes  the computation  of
decision  rules  a very straightforward  matter. The  closed-form  expressions  for the  decision
variables  as  follows:
(8) o,  =  ll]',
12L=
H
0o(1  +v(1 -F))
I










where  y, = 0, * FEVf;.;.
The  simple  form of these  decision  rules  is obviously  a result  of the  particular
assumptions  we have  made  about  preferences,  production  possibilities  and  the (100%)  rate  of
depreciation  of capital. The  decision  rules  for consumption  and  capital  are  in fact identical
to those  in Long and  Plosser  (1983). The  decision  rules  for labor  and  leisure  differ from
those  in I-ong and Plosser  because  of the appearance  of the v term.  Note that if  v  = 0 then
the  decision  rules  for labor  and  leisure  are  almost  identical  to those  in tnng and  Plosser.
Thus the presence  of the cash  constraint  simply has  the effect of lowering the allocation  of
effort to each  of the alternative  productive  activities,  and  concomilantly  raising  leisure.
Thus,  comparing  two economies,  one  with and  one  without  the cash  constraint,  the  economy
with the cash  constraint  would have  a lower level of output and welfare than tlle one without.
One other point to note about these  decision  rules is the absence  of the inflation rate or rate
of growth  of the  money  stock, p.  That  is, this  economy  exhibits  superneutrality  - real
o,,=  [ry)',,
1Jallocations  are independent  of the  rate  of growth  of the  money  stock,  and  there  are  no costs
associated  with the inflation  tax.
It is straightforward  to show  that  in a version  of this model  without  money  utility
denominated  prices  for each  good  are:
Standard  manipulation  of the  equilibrium  conditions  of our model  allow  us to write dollar-
denominated  prices in our model as
P.. =  ''
,',  Y,.,
,=N,'(i-N,F 'it- 




uFu,  -''' uEo,
(r3)
That  is, the nominal  prices  are  directly  proportional  to the  utility.denominated  prices,  and
also  to the nominal  money  stock. ,In  our model,  nominal  aggregate  output  (denominated  in
t  (r  r  \
terms  of dollars)  is  equal  to 8P,.,Y,., =41  t  f,i v!O,l  and  is  direcfly  proportional  to
i=l  \ i=l  i=l  I
the money stock.  Note that this expression  is sirnilar to a strong version of the quantity
lr  I  \
theory,  with "velociry"  consrant  at | f,  y,/vf  O,  | .
\ l=1  r=1  |
Dynamics:
The  dynamic  behavior  of this economy  is implied  by the  technology  as  summarized
by the  production  functions,  along  with the  decision  rules  for the inputs  to the  production
processes.  It is convenient  to write the system  in logarithmic  form as  follows:
t41tt-=k+4y.,+2. (14)
where  we adopt  the  convention  that  lower-case  letters  denote  the  logarithms  of the
corresponding  upper-case  variable. Thus,  y, is the 1Xl  vector
(log(1.),log(Yr,,;,...,  tog(fa,))/,  /c  is  an Ixl  vector  of constants,  and  z, is the  stochastic
vector  (  log(Z,.)  ,log(22,),  ...,loC(2.))' .  Since  our primary  focus  in this paper  is on the
evolution  of the distribution  of prices,  we also  need  to specify  a stochastic  process  for the log
of the  nominal  money  stock,  2..
The  evolution  of prices  is given  by
P, = kp.+ Lrh, - lt
where  pr = (log(P,.),log(Pr,),  ...,log(Pr,J)/,  &o  is an  1xl  vector  of constaats,  and  r. is an
1Xl  vector  of ones. An important  point to note  from this expression  is that  the  money  stock
only affects  the mean  of the cross-section  distribution of prices and not any of the higher
moments.  On the  other  hand,  the shape  of the  cross-section  distribution  of inflation  is
determined  by output growth (including secular  trends)  in the various sectors.
It is straightforward  to calculate  a variety of measures  of the aggregate  price level that
correspond  to the measures  commonly  used  to gauge  inflation in the real world.  Three
standard  price  aggregates  are  the  consumer  price index  (CPD,  the  fixed-weight  GDP  deflator
(PGDPF),  and  the  implicit GDP deflator,  all of which  are  easily  calculated  for our model,
and  which  differ primarily in terms  of how they  weight  the individual  prices. In what
(1s)
15fbllows we will to focus  on the relationship  between  the skewness  of the  distribution  of
prices  and  the  rate  of inflation  as  measured  by the  GDP deflator. Our results  are  robust  to
the  use  of other  measures  of the aggregate  price  level.
4. Calibration
Our objective  in this  paper  is to explore  the relationship  between  the  distribution  of
individual price changes  and the aggregate  inflation rate in a model with complete  price
flexibility.  Thus  it is desirable  to have  as  many  prices  as  possible  endogenously  determined
,  within our model,  and  to have  fluctuations  in these  prices  driven  by shocks  that  are  in some
well-defined  sense  comparable  to the shocks  hitting different sectors  in reality.  This creates
an important trade off.
.  In principle  there  is no limit to the  number  of sectors  we could  have  in our model.
However if we are to allow for interactions  between  sectors  that are in some  sense
representative  of those  observed  in the real  world, we are  constrained  by the sectoral  detail
reported  in the  Input-Output  (I-O) Tables. For example,  the 1987  benchmark  I*O accounts
are  available  at both  a two-digit  and  six-digit  level  of disaggregation.  At the  two-digit  level,
the  I-O table  covers  95 industries,  while at the  six.digit  level  the  I-O table  provides  details
for some.480  industries.  However,  an even  more  important  constraint  arises  if we wish  to
calibrate  the shocks  hitting different sectors  to match  tlose hitting sectors  in the data. The
technology  shock  in our model  is a shock  to productivity,  so we are  constrained  by the
number  of sectors  for which we can obtain data on both value added  and the labor and
capital  inputs. Here  we are  constrained  by the level  of detail  reported  in the  National
r6Income  and  Product  Accounts  (NIPA) and  Fixed  Reproducible  Tangible  Wealth  in the  United
States  (U.S. Department  of Commerce,  1993b). Section  6 of U.S. Depaftment  of Commerce
(1992,  1993a)  provides  estimates  of GDP and  the  number  of full-time  equivalent  employees
by industry  for some  59 private  sector  industries  (capital  stock  estimates  are  available  at
essentially  the same  level  of sectoral  detail),  so  this provides  an  upper  bound  on the  amount
of sectoral  detail  that  is possible  in our model. A final complication  arises  from the  fact  that
the sectors  in the I-O Tables  do not always  correspond  directly  to the  sectors  or industries
reported  in the National  Income  and  Product  Accounts.
.  To overcome  this latter  complication,  we consolidated  the  industry  classifications  in
the two basic  data sources  into 49 industries  (see  Table 3 for the way tlle industries  were
matched  up).  The  essential  problem  with combing  information  from.  both  sources  is that  in
some  cases  the  NIPA give more  industrial  detail,  while in some.  cases  the  I-O table  gives
more  industrial  detail. For example,  NIPA reports  the  output  and  full time equivalent
employees  on "Farms", while the  I-O Table  distinguishes  between  the  output  of "Livestock
and  Livestock  Products"  and  "  Other  Agriculn:ral  products". Likewise,  whereas  the  I-O
Table  reports  output  for "Insurance"  the  NIPA distinguishes  between  "ksurance  Carriers"
. and  "Insurance  Agents,  Brokers  and  Services". In some  cases  there  is a logical
corrcspondence  between  the industry  categories  in each  source:  for example,  "Wholesale
Trade" in the  I-O Table  is probably  essentially  the same  as "Wholesale  Trade"  in NIPA, and
"Air Transportation"  in the I-O Table  is probably  the same  as "Transportation  by Air"  in
t]NIPA..,
Having  calibrated  the,4 matrix  of our model  to the 1987  benchmark  I-O table,  the
vector  of coefficients  b is recovered  from the  assumption  of constant  returns  to scale,  i.e.
/V
\.r bi = |  -  | ..  ar,,. To calibrate  the  vector 0 , we note  that  the  decision  rules  for consumption
c..
of each  type  of good  imply that 0. = yi;i.  We can  obtain  estimates  of the share  of each
-  i,t
sector's  output  (y;) in aggregate  output  from the 1987  I-O table. The  same  table  also  allows
us to estimate  the fraction of each  sector's  output that was allocated  to consumption  that
year,  which  together  with the  estimate  of 1, allows  us to obtain  an  estimate  of 0i.
'  The  remaining  coefficients  that  need  to.be  set  are  the  discount  factor, p, and  the
fraction  of consumption  purchases  that  rnust  be held  as  cash  at the  end  of each  period, v.
We set p = 0.95 somewhat  arbitrarily,  although  this figure is comparable  to those  used  in
other  applied  studies. Likewise  we set v  = 0.1, again  somewhat  arbitrarily. Our results  are
not particularly  sensitive  to our choices  for these  two parameters.
Experiment 1: Our first experiment  examines  the behavior  of inflation and the distribution of
prices in an economy  with forty-nine sectors  but with no input-output  relations  between  the
sectors  and  with each  sector  subject  to i.  i.  d. shocks  of equal  variance. Thus  we set  the  .4
matrix equal  to a diagonal  matrix  with (arbitrarily  chosen)  0.333  on the  main  diagonal. We
assume  tlat productivity  follows  an  z4R  (1) process  with persistence  parameter  equal  to 0.95
and with the standard  deviation  of the iRnovations  set  equal  to the average  value of the
"We  also  adjusted  the  published  I-O table  to allocate  the non-labor  related  components  of
valued  added  among  the  other  inputs  on a proportional  basis. See  lnng and  Plosser  (1983),
fn.22.
18innovations  of the  Solow  residuals  estimated  for each  sector.
Experiment  2:  For our second  experiment  we calibrated  the,4 matrix  to the 1987  I-O direct
requirements  "use" table  and  the 0 vector  using  data  from Table  2.1 of the 1987  I-O
accounts,  but retained  the  assumption  about  the  shock  process  used  in experiment  1.
Experiment  3:  For our third experiment  we returned  to the  specification  of the.4 matrix
and 0 vector  used  in the first experimenl, but calibrated  the technology  shocks  to the actual
postwar  data. One  way to do this is simply  to estimate  standard  Solow  residuals  for each
sector,  i.e.
2,., = log(2,,) = log(vr.) -  a, log(H,.) -  (1-a)  log(K,.,,J
where log({.)  is the  log of GDP in sector  i,  log(I{.)  is the log of the  number  of tull time
equivalent  employees  in the i'th sector,  log(Ki.r-,)  is the log of the net stock  of capital  in
sector  i at the  end  of period  r-1, and a, is the  share  of labor  in sector  I production.e  We
linearly  detrend  sectoral  productivity  and  estimate  a first order  autoregressive  process  for the
detrended  series. The estimated  trend and autoregressive  model are then  used  to speciff the
stochastic  process  used  to generate  productivity  in the  model. [n order  to capture  the
comovement  present  in actual  productivity,  in our simulation  exercises  below  we  employ
resampled  (with replacement)  residuals  from the  estimated  productivity  autoregressions.  This
'Ideally  we  would  also  incorporate  hours  worked  in our  measure  of the  labor  input  in the
different  sectors,  but this  data  does  not seem  to be  available  at the  required  sectoral  detail.
19allows  technology  shocks  in our model  to reflect  the  cross-section  distribution  of actual
technology  shocks  without  us having  to specify  a parametric  distribution  for sectoral  shocks.
Experiment  4: For our penultimate  experiment,  we calibrate  the  r4  matrix, the 0 vector  to
the 1987  I-O tables  and  the stochastic  process  for productivity  in each  sector  to the  acfiial
postwar  data  and  use  resampled  residuals  for productivity  shocks.
Experiment  5: In each  of the  experiments  above  we.assume  that  the  stock  of money  rs
constant  to isolate  the importance  of real shocks  in generating  the skewness-inflation
correlation, For our last  experiment,  we repeated  experiment  4 again,  except  with a
stochastic  process  for t}re  money  stock  that  is calibrated  to the  monetary  base.
Each  of these  experiments  introduces  progressively.  more  .  interaction  between  the
sectors  and  allows  for greater  diversity  in the shocks  hitting  the sectors.  The  set  of
experiments  is designed  to help us isolate  the relative importance  of the input-output
interaction  between  sectors  and idiosyncratic  shocks  in generating  a relationship  between
skewness  and inflation.  In the first experiment,  there is no interaction  and the shocks  hitting
each  sector  are completely  independent  of each  other.  The second  experiment  allows for
interaction  tlrough  input-output  relationships,  but retains  the assumption  of independent
shocks. The third experiment  allows for no interaction  through input-output  relationships  but
does  allow for serially  correlated  shocks  in each  sector,  with the  shocks  drawn  from the
estimated  distribution. Drawing  from the  empirical  distribution  also  allows  the  shocks  to
productivity  in each  sector  to be  contemporaneously  correlated.  The  fourth experiment
20allows  for input-output  type  interaction  between  sectors  and  also  allows  for correlation  in the
state  of technology.  in each  sector.  Note  that  for each  of the  first four experiments  we assume
a constant  money  growth  rate. The last  experiment  illustrates  the  effects  of adding  monetary
"noise" to this simple  economy.
5, Results
For each  experiment  we specified  and  calibrated  the  model  as  described  above  and
simulated  it 500  times  for 44 periods  (with an initial So-period  startup  to eliminate  any
potential  effects  of initial conditions).  For each  simulation  we calculated  the.  correlations
reported  in Table  1.  Table  4 presents  the  correlations  of various  leads  and  lags  of the
unweighted  and  weighted  skewness  with a variety  of aggregate  inflation  measures  in each  of
the five artificial  economies.lo  Moving  down  through  the  table,  we see  that  in the  economy
with no interaction  between  the sectors  and  i.i.d. shocks  (experiment  1) there  is no
relationship  between  either  measure  of skewness  and  aggregate  inflation. Allowing for
interaction  through the input-output  structure  alone  (experiment  2), we are still unable  to
obtain much of a relationship  between  skewness  and inflation.
However,  in the  third experiment  we find a strong  contemporaneous  relationship
between  the skewness  and  aggregate  inflation. The.  correlation  with the  average  of the
sectoral  price  changes  is 0.526  while the  correlation  with.  thp  GDP deflator  is 0.494. These
correlations  are  both  somewhat  larger  than  those  observed  in the  data  (0.281  to 0.416). The
'uNote  that  for experiments  I and  3 we only report  the  correlations  between  the weighted
measures  since  all sectors  are  the same  size  by construction  and  so  there  is no difference
between  weighted  and  unweighted  measures.
21intuition  for what's  going  on seems  to be as  follows. Allowing the  sectoral  productivity
shocks  to be  correlated  with one  another  (as  is the  case  in the  data)  causes  current  sectoral
inflation  rates  to be  correlated  with each  other. This in turn generates  a positive  correlation
between  skewness  and  inflation  as  a few large  shocks  have  a disproportionate  effect  on both
statistics.  However  because  the  r4  manix is diagonal,  the sectoral  interaction  is short  lived,
and  as  a result  the  skewness  in the  cross  section  distribution  does  not display  substantial
leading  behavior  for aggregate  inflation.
In experiment  4, the  contemporaneous  correlation  between  both  of the skewness
measures  is slightly  less  than  in experiment  3, but we now find a modest  leading  relationship
between  skewness  and  inflation. At the  one-year  lag this  correlation  ranges  from 0.173  to
0.253,  somewhat  less  than  the  correlations  found  in the  data  (which  range  between  0.413  and
0.544). Note  that  this is the only one  of the four economies  we study  that  is capable  of .
.  generating  any  sort  of a leading  role for skewness  in explaining  inflation.
Adding monetary  shocks.
The  above  experiments  demonstrate  that  it is possible  for a flexible  price  model
driven by shocks  to total factor productivity to generate  the positive correlation  between
skewness  and  inflation. The  question  remains  as  to how successful  a model  with both
productivity  and  monetary  shocks  is in this regard. In this  section,  we add  money  growth
variability  as  an additional  source  of price variability. Because  money  affects  only the mean
of the  cross  section  distribution  but not any  of the  higher  moments,  adding  money  growth
variability  essentially  adds  noise  to aggregate  inflation-skewness  relationship.  This  will
22reduce  the  correlation  between  inflation  and  skewness  predicted  by the model;  the  degree  to
which  that  correlation  is reduced  depends  on the relative  variability  of money  and
productivity  shocks.
We used  monetary  base  as  our measure  of the  money  stock  and  fitted an.,4R(1,)  model
to the  growth  rate  of the  base. The  estirMted  autoregression  and  the resampled  residuals
were  used  as  the stochastic  process  for money  in the  model. The  last  four rows  of Table  4
(Experiment  5) presents  the results  of adding  money shocks  to the model.  Adding monetary
variability  does  cause  the  correlation  between  inflation  and  skewness  to fall, as  we would
expect;  but not to disappear.  .  The contemporaneous  correlations  are more in line with what
we see  in the data,  while the  correlations  at tie one-year  lag are  somewhat  lower. The
correlations  at other  leads  and  lags  are  all essentially  zero.
.  Thus,  even  after  adding  monetary  variability,  this  particular  flexible.price  model  is
still capable  yielding  a positive  correlation  between  skewness  and  inflation. As expected,
.  adding.  a variable  money  stock  does  reduce  the  size  of this  correlation  but does  not eliminate
it.  Again it needs  to be noted  that in a model in which money is not superneutral,  such  as a
model with a standard  cash-in-advance  constraint,  or in which the monetary  authority
responds  to real  shocks,  a variable  money  stock  will not  just add  noise  to the relationship
between  skewness  and  aggregate  inflation. Depending  on the nature  of the  nominal  and  real
interactions,  the correlation  between  aggregate  inflation  and  skewness  may  rise  or fall.
Sectoral  Solow  Residuals  and the Inflation-Skewness  Correlation
From the  preceding  analysis  is clear  that  the  properties  of the  actual  Solow  residuals
LJplay a crucial  role in generating  the  correlation  between  inflation  and  skewness  that  we see  ln
the  model. Indeed,  the  correlation  between  skewness  and  the  mean  of the  cross-section
distribution  of sectoral  total  factor  productivity  growth  rates  is higher  than  that  of the
corresponding  sectoral  inflation  rates  (0.656  for the  unweighted  residuals,  0.632  for the
weighted  residuals,  versus  0.413  for the  unweighted  prices  and  0.397  for the  weighted  prices
in Table  1).  This raises  the  question  of what  properties  of the  estimated  Solow  residuals  are
important in generating  the positive correlation between  the skewness  of sectoral  inflation
rates  and aggregate  inflation when these  shocks  are used  as inputs in our model.
Perhaps,  the  simplest  explarntion  for the  correlation  between  the skewness  of the
cross-section  distribution  of prices  and  the aggregate  inflation  rate  (as.  measured  by the  mean
of the cross-section  distribution);  which  we also  observe  in the  sectoral  Solow  residuals,  is
that there is substantial  comovement  in the measured  sectoral  productivity shocks. To see
the  importance  of this  comovement  more  clearly,  in Figures  2 and  3 we examine  the
(average)  effect of a one standard  deviation  productivity shock  in one of the sectors  on the
cross-section  distribution  of prices.rl For experiments  1 and  2 this implies  a shock  of 0.0456
to just one  of the sectors.l2  Because  in experiments  3 and  4 the  productivity  shocks  across
sectors  are correlated,.  we set the shock  equal  to the standard  deviation of the first principal
"These  are  based  on histograms,  before  and  after  the shock,  averaged  over  500
simulations  of the  model. Because  the  effect  of a shock  on the  cross-section  distribution
depends  on the shape  of the  cross-section  distribution  at the  time of the shock,  for each
impulse  response  replication  .the  initial cross-section  distribution  was  randomly  selected  by
simulating  the  model  50 periods  before  the  time  period  of the shock.
r2The  results  are  not particularly  sensitive  to which  sector  is shocked.  In the  Figures  2
and  4, we shocked  the  sector  with the largest  value  of "gamma"-this  sector  happens  to be
the retail  trade  sector  with a weisht  of 0.2378.component  of the  covariance  matrix  of innovations  in actual  sectoral  Solow  residuals
(0.1995).13  The  first principle  component  alone  explains  about  28 percent  of the  sum  of the
sectoral  productivity  shock  variances.  The  factor  loading  of this shock  is determined  by the
first eigenvector  of the  covariance  matrix. This factor  loading  is heavily  weighted  on
manufacturing,  especially  motor vehicles,  fabricated  metal  industries,  stone,  clay,  and  glass
products,  along  with truck and  water  transportation,  wholesale  and  retail  trade,  nonmelallic
minerals  mining  and  oil and  gas.
It is clear from Figure 2 that when sectoral  shocks  are independent  these  shocks  have
a negligible  effect  on the  cross-section  distribution. Contrast  Figure  2 with Figure  3. In
Figure  3, we see  that  a shock  to the  first principal  component  of sectoral  Solow  residuals  has
a substantial  affect  on the  cross-section  distribution. Because  actual  sectoral  Solow  residuals
are  substantially  correlated  with one  another,  a shock  to the  first principal  component  causes
many  of the  sectoral  prices  in the  model  10  move  in the same  way. Furthermore,  because  a
one  standard  deviation  shock  to the first principal  component  is relatively  large,  this shock
has  a disproportionately  large  effect  on the  cross-section  distribution  of sectoral  inflation
rates.
To see  how the  changes  in the  cross-section  distribution  displayed  in Figures  2 and  3,
are  related  to the  aggregate  inflation-skewness  relationship,  we present  in Figures  4 and  5 the
response  of the  skewness  and  the  mean  of the  cross-section  distribution  (both  weighted  and
''It must  be noted  that  the  covariance  matix of innovations  to the  sectoral  Solow
residuals  is not full rank, as  there  are  only 44 observations  but 49 sectors.  Thus,  the  last
five eigenvalues  are  this  matrix are  identically  equal  to zero,  leaving  44 non-zero
eisenvalues.
25unweighted)  to a sectoral  shock. For the  case  of independent  shocks,  the  effect  of a one
standard  deviation  sectoral  shock  on both  the  skewness  and  mean  are  relativelv  small  and
they  move  in opposite  directions. For case  of correlated  shocks,  a shock  to the first
principal  component  causes  skewness  and  mean  inflation  to move  in the  same  direction. In
addition,  the  size  of the shock  matters  as  well.  A large  sectoral  shock  is more  likely to
move  the  mean  and  skewness  of the  cross-section  distribution  in the  same  direction.  to Here
again,  because  a  just a few volatile  shocks  dominate  the  variability  of innovations  in the
Solow  residuals-the  first three  principal  components  account  for over  50%  of the  sum  of the
sectoral  variances--experiments  3 and 4 are better able to generate  a positive aggregate
infl  ation-skewness  relationship.
Thus,  it is clear  that  a flexible  price  model  can  generate  a positive  correlation
between  the skewness  of the  distribution  of price  changes  at a point in time  and  the  aggregate.
inflation  rate  so long  as  there  are  few relatively  large  shocks  that  drive the  movement  in
sectoral  productivities..  It seems  plausible  that  shocks  in a few important  sectors  (e.g.  .
energy)  have  a disproportionately  large  affect  on the  cross-section  distribution  of prices.
. Thus it comes  as no surprise  that the first three principal components  of irurovations  to
sectoral  inflation  rates  from an  AR(I) process  explain  over  50%  of the  variability  of
innovations  to sectoral  inflation  rates,  mirroring  what  we find with the  sectoral  Solow
residuals.
'oA  two standard  deviation  sectoral  shock  will move  t}te  mean  and  skewness  of the  cross-
section  distribution  in t}re  same  direction  even  in experiments  1 and  2.  However,  shocks  this
size  are  relatively  rare  and  their effect  is likely to be diminished  by the  presence  of smaller
shocks  in the  other  sectors.
26While in the  model  above  this would  be reflected  in correlated  productivity  shocks,  a
flexible-price  model  with a richer  contemporaneous  input-output  structure  could  generate  this
sectoral  interaction  without  relying  on such  strong  correlation  among  sectoral  productivity
shocks.ts  Of course,  it is possible  that  the  comovement  in the sectoral  productivity  shocks
reflects  other  phenomena  such  as  extemal  returns  to scale  (Caballero  and  Lyons  (1992))  or
countercyclical  markups  (Rotemberg  and  Woodford  (1992)). Indeed,  Basu  (1995)  has  argued
that  to the  extent  that  menu-cost  pricing  implies  countercyclical  markups  it  will result  in
measured  sectoral  productivity  being  correlated  with aggregate  demand  shocks.  Whe&er
most  of the observed  comovement  in our estimated  sectoral  Solow  residuals  is the result  of
common  productivity shocks  or the effects  of aggregate  demand  shocks  operating  through
countercyclical  markups  or other  mechanisms  is the  topic  of future  work.  Regardless,  the
existence  of a positive  correlation  between  the  cross-section  distribution  of prices  and .'
aggregate  inflation  by itself  tells  us little about  the  presence  of sticky-prices.
6, Conclusions
In this  paper  we explored  the  relationship  between  shifts  in the  distribution  of prices
and  the  aggregate  inflation  rate  in the  context  of a simple  dynamic  general  equilibrium  model
with multiple  sectors.  The  idea  that  changes  in the distribution  of relative  price  changes
might  have  implications  for the  overall  inflation  rate  dates  back  at least  forty years,  and  has
recently  been  forcefully  argued  by Ball and  Mankiw (1995). A crucial  part  of the  story  that
''In Balke  and  Wynne  (1996),  we examine  a flexible  price model  that  explicitly  include
output  of other  sectors  as  intermediate  inputs.they  tell is that  firms face  significant  menu  costs  associated  with changing  nominal  prices,
and  they  argue  that  the  existence  of a relationship  between  the skewness  of the  cross-section
distribution  of price  changes  is strong  evidence  of the  existence  of menu  costs  at the firm
level.
What  we have  shown  in this  paper  is that  it is possible  to observe  the  same  types  of
correlations  between  the  skewness  of the  distribution  of price  changes  and  the overall
inflation  rate  in a very simple  dynamic  general  equilibrium  model  with no costs  of adjusting
prices  when  such  a model  is calibrated  to match  key features  of the  U:S. economy. We do
not claim  success  along  all dimensions.  While our model  does  capture  the  contemporaneous
relationship  between  skewness  and  inflation  reasonably  well, and  also  some  of the tendency
for skewness  to lead the aggregate  inflation rate, we are less  successful  in capurring  other
.  aspects  of the lead-lag  relationship  between  the  two variables.l6  Whether  a model  wi0r menu
costs.  is more  or less  successful  in this regard  is a question  for future  research.
Our guess  is that where the implications  of sticky and flexible prices for the cross-
section  distribution of prices (and its relationship  to the aggregate  inflation rate) will probably
differ are  in the  response  of the  cross-section  distribution  to purely  monetary  shocks  and  not
in the  overall  correlation  between  the  skewness  and  mean  of the  distribution. For the
flexible-price  model  described  above,  monetary  shocks  shift the  entire  cross-section
distribution  but do not change  its shape  (although  as  we noted  this is an outcome  of the way
we motivate  the  holding  of money). However,  for a menu-cost  or sticky-price  model
'oA  comparison  of the  results  of experiments  3 and  4 suggests  that  the elimination  of the
assumption  of a 100%  depreciation  rate  for capital  would  probably  help  in this regard.monetary  shocks  may  affect  the  shape  of the  cross-section  distribution  as  some  prices  change
in response  to monetary  shocks  but not others. In future  work, we hope  to determine
whether  sticky-price  sectoral  models  imply this "reverse  causality"  and  whether  there  is
evidence  for it in the  data.
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49 0:151 o.261 0.459 0.281 0.238 0.226 0.152
Weighted
Skelpness
49. 0.210 0.339 0,534 0.4r6 o.212 0.rq3 0.120
Notes  to Table: Entries  show  the  correlation  between  inflation  and  skewness  at various  leads
and  lags  i.e. Corr(nr, skewt-) fot j =-3 to 3.  Arurual  data. Data  from Vining.  and
Elwertowski  (1976)  are  from their  Tables  I and  2 and  are  for the  period  1948-1974  at the
item  (eight  digit) level  of disaggregation.  Note  that  rhe  inflation  series  in Vining and
Elwertowski  is simply  the  unweighted  mean  of a.ll  of the individual  price  changes.  Data
from Ball and  Mankiw (1995)  are  from their Table  II and  is for the  period  1948-1989  at the
four-digit  level  of disaggregation.
30Table 2
Explanatory  power  of skewness  variable  for GDP  deflator  inflation






















































Fr** 4.863** 4.L64** 4.545** 5.73'7***
Frro.  o"r. 3.507+* 5.  186**
n' 0.591 0.655 0.693 0.650 0.711
Durbin Watson
Statistic
2.O2 L.87 1.9'l 1.92 2.O4
Notes  to Table: Sample  period  1947-1993.  Standard  errors  in parentheses.  *** denotes
significance  at the l%  level; ** denotes  significance  at the  5% level; * denotes  significance
at the !0% level.  F  rrn  is the  value  of the F-statistic  for testing  the  restriction  that  the
coefficients  on the  skewness  variables  are  jointly equal  to zero. Fr,o.r"u.  is the  value  of the
F-statistic  for testing  the  restriction  that  the  coefficients  on the standard  deviation  variables
are  jointly equal  to zero.Tabl€  3
Concordance  behveen  NIPA and  I-O sector  classifications
Consolidated
industry  number
Line  Number  in
Table  6 of NIPA
Commodity  Number  in 1987  Input  Output  Table
Farms 5 l+2
z Agricultural  Services,  Forestry  and
Fisheries
6 3+4
3 Metal  Mining 8 5  +6
4 Coal  Mining 9 7
5 Oil and  Gas  Extmclion l0 8
6 Nonmetallic MineBls  (Except Fuel) ll 9+  l0
7 Construction lt  +12
8 Lumber  and  Wood  Products t5 zo+21
9 Fumiture  and  Fixtures 22+23
10 Slone,  Clay  and  Class  Products 35+36
ll Prjmary  Metal  Products t8 37+38
t2 Fabricaled  Metal  Products 39+40+41+47
l3 Mrchinery  (Except  Electrical) 20 43  +  44  + 45  + 46  + 47  + 48  + 49  + 50
t4 Electric  and  Electronic  Equipment 7l 51+52+53  +54+55+56+  57  +58
l-) Motor  Vehicles  and  Equipment z2 59A+598
l6 Other  Transportation  Equipment 60+6t
t1 Instruments  and  Related  Pmducts 24 62+63
,8 Miscellaneous  Manufacturing
Industries
25 64
t8 Food and Kindred Products 27 14
20 Tobacco 28 t5
2l Textile  Products 29 l6+  l7
22 Apparcl  and  Other  Textile  Products 30 18+19
Paper  and  Allied Producrs 24+25
24 Printing  and  Publishing 264+268
?5 Chemicals  and Alli€d  Productt 33 27  A+278+294+298
Petroleum  and  Coal  Products 34 30+31
27 Rubber and Miscellaneous  Plastic
Products
35 28  f32
28 Leather axl  Leather Products 36 33+34
JLTable  3 (Continued)
29 Railroad Tmnsponadon rnd Local
a d Interu|bln  Passenger  Tmnsit
39+40 654
30 Truoking  and  Warehousing 4l 658
3l Watcr  Tmnsponation 42 65C
32 Air Transponation 43 65D
Pipelines  ard Transportation  Services 44+45
34 Telephone  and  Telegraph 4'l
35 Radio and Television 48 67
36 Public  Urilities 49 684+688+68c
3',7 Wholesale  tmde 50 69A
38 Retail  Trade 5l 698+14
Finance 53  +54+55  +59 70A
40 lnsu€nce 56+  57 708
4l Real Estete 58 7lB
Hotels 7ZA
43 Personal  Services 62+65 't78
Business  Services 63+69 '73  A.+738  +',t  3D
45 -  Auto Services 64 '75
46 Movies  and  Other  Recrearion  Services 66+61
Healft Services 68 114
48 Educational  Services 10 'l',t8
49 Other  Services 14 '73C
_l --)Table  4
Corelation  between  skewness  of distibution  of price  changes  and  aggregate  inflation
Corln,, skew,,)
Measure  of aggregar€  inflation Measure  of skewness j=0
Data
GDP  deflaror  - Unweighted  mean Unweighted 0.  t28 0,280 0.4I3 0.413 0.135 o.235 0.126
CDP deflator -Weighted mean Weighted 0,239 0.363 o.544 0.397 o.245 0.  t78 0.128
Fixed  weight  GDP  deflator Unweighted 0.151 0.261 0.459 0.281 0.238 o.226 0.t52
Fixed  weight  GDP  deflalor Weighled 0.210 0.339 0.534 0.416 o.212 0.193 0_1210
Expe  ment I
GDP  defiator  -Weishted  mean WEighted {.003 -0.012 {.0I I 4.009 4.008 0.0r2 o.001
Fixei weighr  cDP deflator Weighted -0.o11 {.017 4.0I I 0.003 -0.00r 0.002 -0.007
Expeiment  2
GDP  denator  - Unweighted  mean Unweight€d o.007 0.0t9 0.030 o.022 0.038 0.022 0.012
GDP denator  -Weighted  mean Weighted ,0.000 -0.000 -0.002 {.047 0.0?3 0.028 0.017
Fixed  weight  GDP  deflator Unweighted 0.000 0.012 0.019 0.035 0.033 0.023 0.013
Fixed  weight  CDP deflaror Weighted 4.007 4.005 0.(XX 4.004 0.035 0.028 0.017
Experiment  3
GDP deflator -Weighted mean Weightcd 4,064 -0.049 0.053 0.526 0.064 -0.0r  I ,0.028
Fixed  weight  CDP deflaror Weighted -0,061 -0.045 0.055 0.494 0.062 -0.020 '0.036
Experiment  4
CDP deflator - Unweighted mean Unweighted 0-005 0.065 0_175 0.492 0.020 4.On -0.037
GDP dellaror -Weighted  mean Weighted 0.037 0.l 0.253 o.521 0_00t {.073 -0.068
Fixed  weiBht  CDP deflator Unweighted 0.009 0.067 0.173 0.395 0.009 -0.038 -0.048
Fixed  weight  GDP  deflator Weighted 0.021 0.084 0.219. 0.485 0.006 ,0.067 -0.067
Experiment  5
GDP  deflator  - Unweightcd  mean Unweighted 0.ot2 0.059 0.140 0.398 0.032 -0.009 {.024
CDP  deflator  - WeGhted  mean Weighted 0.028 0.088 0.179 0.382 0.033 -o.022 {.023
Fixerl  weight  cDP deflator Unw€ighted 0.017 0.062 0.135 0-319 0.025 -0.014 4.U5
Fixerl  weight  GDP  deflator Weighted 0.020 0.078 0.170 0-393 0.037 -0.024 4.m2
Notes.  to Tsble:
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Response  of cross-section  distribution of price changes
to a one-standard-deviation  shock
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Original  cross-section  distributionFigure  3
Response  of cross-section  distribution of price changes
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Cross-section  distribution  after  shockFigure  4
Response  of sl<ewness  and mean  of cross-section  distribution of price changes






















Weighted  mean  of inflation
{q 10 6 0
Weighted  skewnessFigure  5
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